Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment by Ioannidou, Vasso et al.
Review of Finance (2015) 19: pp. 95–144
doi:10.1093/rof/rfu035
Advance Access publication: September 9, 2014
Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing:
Evidence from aQuasi-Natural Experiment*
VASSO IOANNIDOU1, STEVEN ONGENA2 and
JOSE´-LUIS PEYDRO´3
1Lancaster University, 2University of Zurich, Swiss Finance Institute, CEPR,
and 3ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Cass Business School, CREI,
Barcelona GSE, CEPR
Abstract. We study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Bolivia, a dollarized
country where monetary changes are transmitted exogenously from the USA. We find that
a lower policy rate spurs the granting of riskier loans, to borrowers with worse credit
histories, lower ex-ante internal ratings, and weaker ex-post performance (acutely so
when the rate subsequently increases). Effects are stronger for small firms borrowing
from multiple banks. To uniquely identify risk-taking, we assess collateral coverage,
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expected returns, and risk premia of the newly granted riskier loans, finding that their
returns and premia are actually lower, especially at banks suffering from agency problems.
JEL Classification: E44, E5, G01, G21, G28, L14
“The root cause of this credit correction was the Federal Reserve’s will-
ingness to keep money too easy for too long. The federal funds rate was
probably negative in real terms for close to two years between 2003 and
2005. This led to a misallocation of capital.”
“The Bernanke Call – II,” Review & Outlook, Editorial,
The Wall Street Journal, August 11th, 2007
“A rate cut does not just increase the supply of cash; it directly influ-
ences people’s calculations about risk. Cheaper money makes other
assets look more attractive.”
Monetary Policy—Hazardous times, Leaders, Opinion,
The Economist, August 23rd, 2007
1. Introduction
The crisis in the credit markets started in August 2007 and has cast its long
shadow until today. Many observers immediately argued—and continued to
do so until today—that during the long period of very low levels of monetary
policy rates that preceded the crisis, banks softened their lending standards
and failed to price the extra risks they took.1 Governor Jeremy C. Stein for
example recently stressed once more that “a prolonged period of low interest
rates, [. . .], can create incentives for agents to take on greater duration or
1 Between 2001 and 2005, nominal short-term interest rates were the lowest in almost four
decades and below Taylor rates in many countries, while real rates were negative (see
Taylor (2007) and Rajan (2010)). Rajan (2006), Taylor (2008), Borio and Zhu (2008),
Blanchard (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Calomiris (2009), and Diamond and Rajan
(2009), among others, and numerous contributions in The Wall Street Journal, The
Financial Times, and The Economist conjecture that very low short-term interest rates
may result in excessive risk-taking. Adrian and Shin (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009),
and Shin (2009) discuss the importance of overnight rates for bank liquidity and leverage,
affecting in turn risk-taking by banks. Short-term interest rates also affect the pricing of
equity (Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005), bonds (Manganelli and
Wolswijk, 2009), and buyouts (Axelson et al., 2013).
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credit risks, or to employ additional financial leverage, in an effort to ‘reach
for yield” ’ (Stein, 2013).2
In this article, we empirically analyze whether the level of the monetary
policy rate affects bank loan risk-taking, expected returns, and pricing. To
the best of our knowledge, this article and Jime´nez et al. (2014) were the first
papers to concurrently investigate the impact of monetary policy on bank
risk-taking.3 Exploiting the opportunities offered by their respective institu-
tional settings and data, the two papers shed light on different key aspects of
the “risk-taking channel”—as it has come to be known in the literature.4
Both papers investigate how exogenous changes in the monetary policy rate
affect the quality of new loans. Although the two papers draw from two
entirely different financial systems in terms of development and economic
conditions, that is, Bolivia and Spain, results are very similar: lower
monetary policy rates are found to increase the likelihood that loans to
lower quality borrowers are granted, particularly by banks with more
acute agency problems.5
2 See also the prescient speech in Jackson Hole by Raghuram Rajan, as IMF Chief
Economist, on the impact of low monetary policy rates on excessive risk-taking (Rajan,
2006).
3 The impact of monetary policy on the aggregate volume of credit in the economy has
been widely analyzed. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for example reviews the literature
dealing with the general credit channel, while Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and
Stein (2000) and Jime´nez et al. (2012) focus on the bank lending channel. Within the (firm)
balance sheet channel, lower short-term interest rates improve borrowers’ net worth and
entice banks to grant loans to borrowers of lower quality in the past (Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist, 1996) or with fewer pledgeable assets (Matsuyama, 2007).
4 Allen and Gale (2000), Allen and Gale (2004), Borio and Zhu (2008), Allen and Rogoff
(2011), Acharya and Naqvi (2012), Diamond and Rajan (2012), Dell‘Ariccia, Laeven, and
Marquez (2014), among others. Adrian and Shin (2011) discuss the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy in the latest Handbook of Monetary Economics. They show that a lower
monetary policy rate spurs risk-taking in lending by relaxing the bank capital constraint
that is present due to bank moral hazard. The idea that the liquidity provided by central
banks is important in driving excessive risk-taking is not new however: “Speculative manias
gather speed through expansion of money and credit or perhaps, in some cases, get started
because of an initial expansion of money and credit” (Kindleberger, 1978, p. 54).
5 This similarity makes it less likely that the findings in this article are simply picking-up
some uncontrolled peculiarity of the local system. Following this article and Jime´nez et al.
(2014), extant empirical work-in-progress and published further documents the existence
and potency of a bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy across many countries and
time periods. But none of these papers comes from a setting with exogenous monetary
policy and/or has access to exhaustive information on banks, borrowers and loans,
including individual loan rates, which is essential to uniquely identify the compositional
changes in the supply of credit that take place. See, for example, for the USA (Altunbas,
Gambacorta, and Marquez-Iban˜ez, 2010; Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis, 2011; Paligorova
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But this article—as compared to Jime´nez et al. (2014)—takes a decisive
step further by studying loan expected returns (pricing, collateral require-
ments and actual coverage, and default probabilities over the life of the loan)
as risk-taking can only be identified with these measures. We rely on singular
data from the Bolivian credit register, and study whether banks adjust key
loan conditions, such as loan price and collateral values, to compensate for
the extra risk taken. We find that banks do not.
Importantly also, as compared to Jime´nez et al. (2014), this article
analyzes the impact of changes in monetary policy rate on ex-post credit
risk over the life of the loan. Our findings suggest that—though estimated
within a sharply confined sample period—the time credit risk may crest
when a period with a low monetary policy rate is followed by abrupt and
strong increases in the policy rate (as was the case for example in the USA
and Europe in 2002–07 before the start of the worst financial crisis since the
1930s, in Japan in the 1980s, or in the USA in the 1920s). Therefore, not only
do monetary conditions at the start of the loan matter, but also throughout
its life. Moreover, our findings have crucial implications for bank credit risk
once the USA and Europe leave their current ultralow monetary policy rates
(that have been in place since 2008) and return to normal historical levels.
Finally, this article further explores robustness across time and industries
and salient margins of bank risk-taking in terms of firm, relationship, loan
and macro characteristics and conditions.
Analyzing the impact of the monetary policy rate on bank risk-taking
involves three major identification challenges. First, the monetary policy
rate is often endogenous to economic conditions and—in particular—is
low when risks are high. Second, changes in the demand for loans need to
be disentangled from the changes in the supply of loans. Third, banks could
be adjusting other loan terms to compensate for the extra risk from loans
with higher default probabilities. Consequently, exogenous monetary policy
and exhaustive information on banks, borrowers, and loans—including loan
prices, quantities and collateral requirements and values—are needed to
understand if and how the policy rate affects banks’ risk-taking.
Bolivia during the period 1999–2003 provides us with an excellent—
almost experimental—setting to identify the impact of the monetary policy
rate on bank risk-taking, which is closer to a Mundell–Fleming setting than
the one offered in Spain. During this period, Bolivia’s banking system was
and Santos, 2012; Dell‘Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez, 2013; Buch, Eickmeier, and Prieto,
2014a, 2014b), Austria (Gaggl and Valderrama, 2010), Colombia (Lo´pez, Tenjo, and
Za´rate, 2010a, 2010b), the Czech Republic (Gersˇl et al., 2012), Portugal (Bonfim and
Soares, 2013), and Sweden (Apel and Claussen, 2012).
98 V. IOANNIDOU ETAL.
almost fully dollarized, its currency followed a crawling peg with the US
dollar, and there were hardly any restrictions in its capital account. But its
small economy was not synchronized with the US economy. Consequently,
changes in the US federal funds rate, which from the USA are transmitted
into the Bolivian liquidity markets, provide exogenous variation in the
relevant monetary policy rate.
The Bolivian credit register contains very detailed contract information at
a monthly frequency on all bank loans granted to firms in Bolivia. Each loan
is observed from origination till repayment or default on a monthly fre-
quency, which is important for disentangling the impact of monetary
policy on the quality of newly granted loans to its impact on outstanding
loans. Moreover, crucially for identifying credit supply and excessive bank
risk-taking, the Bolivian credit register contains loan prices, which is not the
case in the large majority of the credit registers around the world, as well as
collateral requirements and values. All this information is necessary to study
loan expected returns, which are crucial to identify risk-taking in lending.
Moreover, matched with bank balance sheet information and key firm char-
acteristics such as identity, industry, debt levels, credit rating, and borrower
credit histories, the register allows us to study bank risk-taking eliminating
alternative hypotheses. We analyze many different loan-specific measures of
loan risk-taking that fit into three categories: (i) the likelihood of granting
loans to borrowers with ex-ante observable past nonperformance or weak
internal credit ratings at origination; (ii) the ex-post likelihood of individual
loan default or the time to such default; and crucially, (iii) the pricing of
credit risk and the expected return of loans (calculated using both the loan
interest rate and the value of the pledged assets).
We find robust evidence that a lower federal funds rate increases banks’
appetite for risk: banks grant new loans to ex-ante less creditworthy bor-
rowers and with a higher ex-post default rate, yet with both lower expected
returns and lower loan spreads. In particular, controlling for numerous
bank, firm, bank–firm relationship, loan, banking market characteristics,
and macroeconomic conditions (as well as loading in eventually both bank
and firm fixed effects), we observe that a decrease in the US federal funds
rate prior to loan origination: (i) increases the likelihood that loans are
granted to observably riskier borrowers with observable past nonperform-
ance or to borrowers with weak internal credit ratings; (ii) leads to the ori-
gination of more loans with a higher probability of default yet lower
expected returns and lower price per unit of risk implying that this extra
risk-taking is supply (and not demand) driven. In pointed contrast, a
decrease in the federal funds rate at repayment or over the life of the loan
is also found to lower the default rate of outstanding loans, suggesting that
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the credit risk taking channel is more toxic when monetary policy rates
increase following a period of low interest rates.
We also document that, when the federal funds rate is low, banks with
more liquid assets and fewer funds from foreign financial institutions take
more risk. Banks with a higher ratio of nonperforming loans or a lower
capital ratio also take more risk. The additional risk that is taken is
mispriced even more by these banks than by the other banks. Banks
dealing with small firms, in multiple relationships or after the introduction
of explicit deposit insurance engage in stronger risk-taking. Both the pricing,
the expected returns, and the stronger risk-taking for banks with more acute
agency problems suggest that low short-term interest rates create excessive
bank risk-taking.6
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 SETTING AND DATA
To econometrically identify changes in the banks’ appetite for risk ideally
one would like to have: (i) variation in short-term interest rates which is not
driven by local economic conditions; and (ii) detailed loan-level information,
including loan rates, volume, maturity, and collateral. Bolivia offers one of
the closest settings—that we know of—to this ideal econometric environ-
ment. In this section we explain why.
During the sample period, the Bolivian peso was pegged to the US dollar
and the banking sector was almost completely dollarized. More than 90% of
deposits and credits were in US dollars, which made Bolivia one of the most
dollarized economies among those that have stopped short of full dollariza-
tion. The exchange rate regime, the absence of restrictions on movements in
6 Similar to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), more liquidity exacerbates agency
problems between the banks, their debt-holders, the supervisors, and the deposit insurance
scheme because of the resulting flexibility to alter risk (Myers and Rajan, 1998). Foreign
depositors, who are large, more sophisticated, and not covered by the domestic deposit
insurance scheme, may be better able and have more incentives to monitor bank managers
and limit moral hazard. Low levels of bank capital (and higher NPLs), by giving less “skin
in the game” for example, also sharpen agency problems (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)
and Freixas and Rochet (2008) for reviews). Our findings, therefore, link higher loan risk-
taking in an environment with low short-term interest rates to more severe agency problems
in banks (Allen and Gale, 2007) further increasing confidence that our empirical testing
strategy identifies supply effects.
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the capital account, and the dollarization imply that the federal funds rate is
the proper measure of monetary policy rates in Bolivia. In fact, during the
sample period the correlation between the US federal funds rate and other
short-term interest rates in Bolivia is very high, suggesting that changes in
the US monetary policy rates are transmitted into the Bolivian liquidity
markets. For example, the correlation coefficients between the US federal
funds rare and the rates on savings deposits, T-Bills, and interbank loans are
equal to 0.92, 0.88, and 0.74, respectively. Instead, the correlation between
the US federal funds rate and measures of economic activity in Bolivia is
negligible and equal to 0.14.7
Our main data source is the Central de Informacio´n de Riesgos Crediticios
(CIRC), the public credit registry of Bolivia. The database is managed by the
Bolivian Superintendent and all banks are required to participate. It contains
detailed information, on a monthly basis, on all outstanding loans granted
by any bank operating in the country. The Register was first studied by
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou (2011).
We have access to information from 1999 to 2003 on a monthly frequency.
For each loan, we have detailed contract information (e.g., date of initi-
ation, maturity, amount, interest rate, rating, currency denomination, value
of collateral, type of loan), information about the borrower (e.g., identity,
region, industry, legal status, number and scope of relationships, total bank
debt, the borrower’s credit history), as well as information on ex-post per-
formance. For each month, we know whether and when a loan has overdue
payments and whether it defaults. Being able to observe the entire loan spell
on a monthly frequency is what allows us to employ a duration model to
disentangle the impact of changes in the monetary policy rates on the quality
of new loan originations from their impact on the quality of outstanding
loans. We complement this dataset with bank characteristics (e.g., size,
capital ratios, nonperforming loans, liquid assets, and foreign financing)
from publicly available bank balance sheet and income statements.
2.2 MEASURES OF BANK RISK-TAKING
The richness of the Register allows us to construct several complementary
measures of bank risk-taking. We start with ex-ante measures of risk
that were directly available to the banks when making their loan decisions
7 By way of comparison, the correlation coefficient between the US federal funds rate and
the US growth rate of real GDP is instead positive and equal to 0.34, as the Federal
Reserve typically raises its monetary policy rate when the growth rate GDP is higher
(Taylor, 1993).
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(e.g., the borrowers’ credit history and their own internal ratings on the
borrowers’ repayment capacity) and examine whether the short-term
interest rate affects the probability of initiating new loans to borrowers
with ex-ante observable credit history problems (i.e., past delinquencies) or
with a subprime rating.
The next step in our empirical strategy consists in assessing within the
framework of a simple probit model the ex-post default probability (of all
individual loans that were newly granted) as a measure of risk. Using an ex-
post measure allows us to differentiate between the effects of monetary
policy at the time of loan origination and at the time of repayment (or
default). We define default (the event of interest) to occur when the bank
downgrades a loan to the default status (a rating of 5) and estimate how the
monetary policy rate—at loan origination and repayment (or default)—
affects the probability of default.8 Controlling for other factors that affect
the probability of default, the effect of the short-term interest rate at loan
origination on the ex-post nonperformance is attributable to risk-taking. Ex-
post defaults are necessary to analyze risk-taking as loan officers use infor-
mation on firm risk which is not available to us (econometricians), thus
complementing the above risk-taking measures based on ex-ante observable
information.
Using the estimates from this probit model (and crucial information as
loan prices and collateral values), we then calculate the ex-ante expected
default probability and the (net) expected return for each newly granted
loan. If bad borrowers demand more loans when interest rates are low,9
and more loans flow to these subprime borrowers, then loans should
exhibit higher expected default rates. Yet, banks may try to adjust the
loan terms to keep loan expected returns constant in this case. However, if
the increase in riskier loans is supply-driven (i.e., it is the banks that are
willing to take more risk, and not the bad borrowers that seek more credit),
then loan expected returns may drop, and may drop more for banks with
more acute moral hazard problems.10
8 Small loans are downgraded to a rating of 5 if there are overdue payments for at least a
certain period of time (91 days for collateralized loans and 121 days for loans that are not
collateralized). Large loans, instead, are downgraded to 5 when the borrower is considered
insolvent (i.e., borrowers’ net worth is close to 0).
9 In Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the demand for funds from risky borrowers increases when
interest rates are higher. The empirical evidence on this account seems mixed (Berger and
Udell, 1992).
10 In the interactions with bank characteristics that proxy for bank moral hazard, we can
control for firm fixed effects.
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Within the framework of a fully specified duration model, we next use the
time to default as a dynamic measure of risk that allows us to better account
for possible changes in loan maturity (duration). In particular, we analyze
the determinants of the hazard rate in each period, that is, the probability
that a loan defaults in period t, conditional on surviving until period t.
A duration model also allows us to further differentiate between the
effects of monetary policy at the time of loan origination and over the life
of the loan to disentangle the differential effects of monetary policy on new
and outstanding loans.
Exploiting the cross-sectional implications of recent theory regarding the
sensitivity of bank risk-taking to monetary policy according to the strength
of banks’ balance sheets (Diamond and Rajan, 2006; Diamond and Rajan,
2009; Adrian and Shin, 2011; Diamond and Rajan, 2012) and moral hazard
problems (Rajan, 2006; Allen and Gale, 2007), we further include in the
duration model interactions between the federal funds rate and key bank
characteristics.
The final step of our empirical investigation is to study the loan rate as the
most salient loan condition, which is often either the only one or the last one
to be adjusted across borrowers and loans, and which is also an easily in-
terpretable nume´raire of risk. Ceteris paribus (i.e., mopping up the changes in
credit demand from riskier borrowers with an array of controls), the average
price per unit of risk should drop if the granting of more riskier loans is
supply-driven (i.e., if banks chase riskier borrowers), and again it should
drop more for banks beset more severely by moral hazard problems. To
control for possible contemporaneous changes in loan demand from
riskier borrowers, we use an array of firm, bank–firm relationship,
banking market, and macroeconomic conditions (in the likely case risky
demand expands when the policy rate is low, loan premia should ceteris
paribus increase, not decrease as we find). In even more conservative speci-
fications, we also employ firm fixed effects as to wipe out any observable and
unobservable firm fundamentals. In robustness checks we also control for
loan terms.11
11 Because a lower interest spread may be driven for example by a higher value of collat-
eral, it is important that we also control for these loan terms. We do so in robustness
because loan terms are endogenous, even though not necessarily to an equal degree and in
all instances. For example, borrowers are commonly known to request a certain amount of
credit with a certain maturity and currency (Kirschenmann, 2012; Brown, Kirschenmann,
and Ongena, 2014); the bank may then require a certain preset minimum level of collateral
coverage (Berger and Udell, 1995); only the interest rate paid on the loan may be the
outcome of a bargaining process in the end (Mosk (2013); see also Degryse, Kim, and
Ongena (2009)).
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More generally, throughout our empirical investigation we report basic
and parsimonious models that nevertheless field wide arrays of bank, firm,
bank–firm relationship, loan and banking market characteristics and macro-
economic conditions, supplemented with comprehensive sets of individual
bank, firm type, firm industry, region, and month dummies. The results are
further robust to many wide-ranging alterations. For example, we assess
various functional forms for all our specifications, employ the US federal
funds rate as an instrument for the Bolivian interbank rate (instead of using
the federal funds rate directly in the specifications), introduce firm fixed
effects and include more macro controls such as additional country risk
measures, cross-border financial linkages, the Bolivian peso–US dollar
exchange rate, and various other short-term or long-term interest rates,
and spreads. Finally, we also study the subperiod stability of our findings.
We discuss these and other robustness checks in more detail when reporting
our results.
3. Results
3.1 BORROWER AND LOAN DEFAULT
3.1.a Dependent variables in the probit models
Table I defines all the variables employed in the empirical specifications, and
provides their mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, and maximum
values.
The first four dependent variables we employ are binary. Hence, we
mainly estimate probit models. A dummy variable PastNPL equals 1 if
any of the borrower’s outstanding loans in the month prior to the initiation
of the loan is nonperforming (i.e., the loan had an overdue payment of 30
days or more),12 and equals 0 otherwise. A dummy PastDefault equals 1 if in
the month prior to the loan initiation the borrower had a loan that had
defaulted ever before (i.e., was given the worst credit rating of 5), and
equals 0 otherwise.13 Both of these past repayment problems are observable
12 The available data does not allow us to distinguish nonperforming loans with past due
payments of 90 days or more (an often used definition of nonperformance) or loans that are
still accruing interest.
13 Hence both measures not only differ in the timing of past loan delinquency, that is, the
month prior to the loan initiation versus the time before the month prior to the loan
initiation, but also in the technical definition of delinquency, that is, nonperformance
(i.e., overdue payment of 30 days or more) versus default (i.e., worst credit rating of 5).
We therefore use Past NPL and Past Default as variable names. Notice that the Bolivian
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to all banks through the credit registry.14 A dummy Subprime equals 1 if the
bank’s own internal credit rating indicated that at the time of loan origin-
ation that the borrower had financial weaknesses rendering the loan repay-
ment doubtful (i.e., had a rating equal to 3 or higher), and equals 0
otherwise.15 All three variables measure risks ex-ante that are directly avail-
able to banks when making their loan decisions.
A fourth dummy Default equals 1 if the granted loan defaults (i.e., is given
the worst rating of 5) and equals 0 otherwise. This variable measures risks
ex-post. We believe that using a combination of ex-ante and ex-post
measures is important. Higher ex-post default rates could be due to “bad
luck”. It is possible banks never intended to take these risks and were just
caught off guard during difficult times. Hence, the ex-ante risk measures and
banks’ intensity to moral hazard problems allow distinguishing whether
higher ex-post loan defaults are due to “bad luck” or to higher ex-ante
risk-taking appetite. At the same time, it is also important to examine
whether any higher ex-ante risk materializes into higher ex-post risk and
defaults.
3.1.b Independent variables
Monetary policy conditions. To measure monetary policy conditions, we use
the monthly average of the nominal US federal funds rate. We label the
monetary policy measure in the month prior to loan origination (t 1) as
Federal Fundst1,16 the measure at loan default or maturity (tþ T) as Fede
ral FundstþT (to include, the latter variable makes sense only when Default is
the dependent variable). During the sample period, the US federal funds rate
averaged around 4.25%, but varied substantially throughout (Figure 1).
During an initial period of monetary policy tightening, the rate climbed
from 4.75% in March 1999 to 6.5% in May 2000. The rate remained at this
credit registry is a “black” credit registry where default is “never” erased from memory
(hence this variable for all practical purposes does not suffer from left censoring introduced
by the start of the studied sample period as the credit registry started recording defaults
since its creation in 1989). Loan nonperformance on the other hand is erased after it ends.
14 Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou (2011) provide a
detailed description of the information sharing regime in place. See also Beck, Ioannidou,
and Scha¨fer (2012).
15 Also on this account, we complement the study by Jime´nez et al. (2014) because they did
not employ the banks’ own internal rating as a measure of credit risk.
16 We also employ the federal funds rate as an instrument for the Bolivian interbank rate.
We run first-stage regressions with and without controlling for macro conditions either at
the individual loan-level or at the year-month level. Using the US federal funds rate as
instrument for the Bolivian interbank rate yields results that are very similar to those
reported.
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plateau of 6.5% until October 2000, followed by a steep decline during a
period of monetary expansion to 1.75% in December 2001 and to 1% by
December 2003. As mentioned earlier, this variation in the US federal funds
rate was transmitted to Bolivian liquidity markets. For example, the rate on
US dollar denominated savings deposits, the rate on the 3-month US dollar
denominated Bolivian Treasury Bills, and the interbank rates follow a
similar pattern.17
Bank, firm, and relationship characteristics. In addition to the measures of
monetary policy conditions, an array of bank, firm, relationship, loan,
market, and macroeconomic controls are included in the specifications.
Bank characteristics are all taken in the month prior to the loan origination.
As a measure of bank size, we use the natural log of total bank assets in
millions of US dollars, lnðAssetsÞt1. Better possibilities for diversification or
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
In
 %
Year:Month
US Federal Funds Rate Bolivian US Dollar Denominated Treasury Bill Rate
Bolivian Interbank Rate
Bolivian US Dollar Denominated Savings Deposit Rate
Growth GDP Bolivia
Figure 1. The US federal funds rate, Bolivian interest rates, and the growth in Bolivian
gross domestic product. The figure displays monthly values of the US federal funds rate, the
Bolivian US dollar denominated savings deposit rate, the Bolivian US dollar denominated
Treasury bill rate, the Bolivian interbank rate, and the growth in Bolivian gross domestic
product.
17 The spread between the Bolivian Treasury Bill rate and the US federal funds rate reflects
country risk. Episodes of political instability occurring during the sample period coincide
with increases in the spread. The empirical analysis includes the International Country Risk
Guide country risk indicator as a control variable, but results are robust to the inclusion of
the spread as well.
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“too big to fail” perceptions (Boyd and Runkle, 1993) for example may
entice large banks to initiate riskier loans. The median bank granting
loans recorded in the register has around 625 million US dollar in assets.18
We also include the ratio of loans to total assets, ðLoans=AssetsÞt1,
to control for the effect that a bank’s financial and asset structure might
affect risk management. A backlog of nonperforming loans may increase
a bank’s appetite for more risk, as the charter value is decreased; hence,
we include the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans,
ðNon Performing Loans=AssetsÞt1. On average almost 8% of the loan
volume is nonperforming, with substantial variation across banks and
time. All specifications also include the ratio of bank equity over total
assets, ðCapital=AssetsÞt1, a key measure of bank agency problems.
Finally, more liquid assets, ðLiquidAssets=AssetsÞt1, and less foreign
financing (and therefore less monitoring), ðForeign Funds=AssetsÞt1, may
allow banks to indulge in risk-taking. This effect may be reinforced by
monetary conditions (an issue we address later by introducing interactions).
The mean and median of both ratios equal around 10%. We also include
twelve individual bank dummies to capture the possibly time-invariant bank
characteristics such as ownership, the choice of bank business model, its
lending technology, and the credit scoring models that are employed (e.g.,
Berger and Udell, 2006; Berger et al., 2008; Degryse, Laeven, and Ongena,
2009).
For firm characteristics, we include three dummy variables to control for
the firm’s legal structure and eighteen industry dummies to capture possible
differences in loan demand.19 Using the information in the Register, we also
compute a firm’s total outstanding bank debt, BankBorrowingt1, in
millions of US dollars as a measure of firm leverage and riskiness. The
average (median) firm borrows around 1.85 (0.47) millions of US dollars
in bank loans. Unfortunately, we cannot match the loans with firm account-
ing information to provide additional controls since for confidentiality
18 We translate all Bolivian peso amounts into US dollars at the prevailing exchange rate.
We report nominal US dollars but include both US and Bolivian inflation rates in all
specifications. The mean annualized monthly US inflation rate for the loans in the
sample equals 2.62%.
19 The list of the industries is: (i) Agriculture and cattle and Farming; (ii) Forestry and
fishery; (iii) Extraction of oil and gas; (iv) Minerals; (v) Manufacturing; (vi) Electricity, gas,
and water; (vii) Construction; (viii) Wholesale and retail trade; (ix) Hotels and restaurants;
(x) Transport, storage, and communications; (xi) Financial Intermediation; (xii) Real estate
activities; (xiii) Public administration defense and social security; (xiv) Education; (xv)
Communal and personal social services; (xvi) Activities of households as employees of
domestic personnel; (xvii) Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies; and
(xviii) Other activities.
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reasons the borrower’s identities have been altered before the data were
given to us. Hence, to control for possible unobserved firm heterogeneity
we introduce firm fixed effects in corresponding linear regressions.
As the database contains the universe of Bolivian bank loans,
we can construct three indicators of bank–firm relationship characteristics.
Multiple Bankst1 equals 1 if the firm has outstanding loans with more than
1 bank, and equals 0 otherwise; MainBankt1 equals 1 if the value of loans
from a bank is at least 50% of the firm’s loans, and equals 0 otherwise; and,
Scopet1 equals 1 if the firm has additional products (i.e., used or unused
credit cards, used or unused overdrafts, and discount documents) with the
bank, and equals 0 otherwise. While more than half of the loans are taken by
firms that have multiple bank relationships, almost 75% of these firms
borrow at least 50% from 1 bank.20 Only 25% of the loans are obtained
jointly with additional bank products.
Loan characteristics. For loan characteristics, we include Amountt,
Interest Ratet, Collateralt, Maturityt, and Installmentt. Most loans are
small to medium-sized. The average and median loan equals 170,000 US
dollars and 50,000 US dollars, respectively, but have a high loan rate of
around 14%; well above the average federal funds rate of 4%. Only 27%
of loans are collateralized. The median loan maturity is 12 months, while the
median time to default or repayment is 4 months. Defaults and early repay-
ments explain the difference between the loan maturity and its observed
duration (i.e., the time between t and tþ T). We ignore early repayment
behavior as lenders may have foresight about early repayment. Finally, 71%
of the loans are installment loans, while the remaining 29% of the loans are
single-payment loans.
Banking market and macroeconomic conditions. To capture banking market
characteristics, we use the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of market
concentration, HHIt1, which is equal to the sum of the squared bank shares
of outstanding loans, calculated per month for each region. The mean HHI
equals 0.18, comparable to levels for the USA and other countries (see, e.g.,
Table I in Degryse and Ongena (2008)). We also include twelve region
dummies to capture other possible structural differences in the banking
markets and regions at large.
20 These statistics are provided per loan. Only around one-fifth of our sample firms have
multiple bank relationships and there is a positive correlation between firm size and the
number of relationships. This pattern is consistent with findings from other countries
(Ongena and Smith, 2000). See also Guiso and Minetti (2010) and Ongena, Tu¨mer-
Alkan, and von Westernhagen (2012) on borrower concentration.
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We include eight variables to control for changes in macroeconomic con-
ditions at loan origination. The growth rate in the real gross domestic
product in Bolivia, GDPBoliviat1, is included to control for variations in
the demand for bank loans over the Bolivian business cycle. The average
growth rate during the sample period was 1.87%,21 varying between 0.42%
and 3.60%.
We further include the USA and the Bolivian inflation rates,
InflationUSt1 and Inflation Boliviat1, respectively. Both inflation rates are
calculated using the corresponding consumer price indexes. During the
sample period, the average Bolivian inflation rate was 2.72%, slightly
higher than the average US inflation rate of 2.62%, though with more than
double its variation.
We also control for changes in country risk, using the composite country
risk indicator from the International Country Risk Guide published by the
PRS Group, CountryRiskt1. This indicator is available on a monthly fre-
quency and encompasses three types of risk, that is, political, financial, and
economic. According to the Guide, a value of 0 indicates high risk, while a
value between 80 and 100 indicates very low risk. During the sample period,
the country risk of Bolivia varied between 65 and 70.
We further include the exchange rate between the Bolivian peso and the US
dollar, ExchangeRatePesoDollart1, the price of its main export product to
the US,22 the Price ofTint1, and the ratio of net exports to its GDP,
NetExportsBolivia=GDPBoliviat1, to capture changes in external monetary
conditions and commodity prices that would affect economic growth and in-
flationary expectations in Bolivia concurrently with its interest rates. We also
include the change in real US GDP growth, REALGDPUSt1. Finally, we
include 11 month dummies to absorb any seasonality in bank activity and a
deposit insurance dummy that equals 1 once deposit insurance is introduced in
December 2001, and equals 0 otherwise (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010).23
3.1.c Estimated coefficients on the federal funds rate variables
As indicated earlier, the estimates in Table II are (mainly) based on probit
estimations.24 For the first model, we report the estimated coefficients and
21 All statistics in Table I are computed by loan. The mean growth rate by month equals
2.04%, slightly higher as the number of outstanding loans and the growth rate are not
perfectly correlated.
22 The tin industry continues to have a discernible effect on the level of economic activity
in general (e.g., Bojanic (2009)).
23 In later robustness we split the sample by this date.
24 The number of loans employed for the estimation varies because either some
information is missing or the binary dependent variable outcome is perfectly
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adjacent to them the estimated marginal effects in italics; for the other
models we report only the estimated coefficients. Standard errors that are
clustered at the bank-month level are always reported between parentheses
on the second row below the estimated coefficients.
In Model (1), we find that a lower federal funds rate prior to loan origin-
ation implies that banks give more loans to borrowers with past nonper-
formance. This impact is not only statistically significant, but also
economically relevant. A 100 basis points decrease in the funds rate, for
example, increases the probability that a loan is granted to a borrower
with nonperforming loans by 1.1 percentage points, a semi-elasticity of
almost 20% (as the mean Past NPL is 5%).
While controlling for an array of factors, the estimates could still result
from a relative increase in the demand for credit from riskier borrowers
(though a lower interest rate actually decreases the demand from risky bor-
rowers in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). In Model (2), we therefore introduce
firm fixed effects. For technical reasons we estimate the model linearly, but
results are virtually unaffected. Indeed, the estimated coefficient equals
0.012***,25 which can be assessed on sight to imply an almost equal
economic relevancy as in the preceding probit model.
Next we replace the dependent dummy variable PastNPL by the
Number of PastNPL, which equals the number of the borrower’s outstanding
loans in the month prior to the initiation of the loan that is nonperforming
(i.e., the loans had an overdue payment of 30 days or more). In linear models
(which are further left untabulated) without and with firm fixed effects,
the estimated coefficients on the federal funds rate equal 0.087*** and
0.045**, respectively.26 For a 100 basis points decrease in the funds rate
for example these estimated coefficients imply an increase in the number of
nonperforming loans by 0.08 and 0.05, or a semi-elasticity of 45% and 23%,
respectively (as the mean number of non-performing loans equals 0.194).
Similar results in terms of statistical significance and economic relevancy
are found for loans to borrowers with defaults in Model (3) and for loans to
borrowers with subprime credit scores in Model (4).27 All these results are
predicted by bank identity, firm type, industry, and/or region (or some combination of these
variables).
25 As in the tables, we use stars next to the coefficients to indicate their significance levels:
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, and *significant at 10%.
26 For easy comparison we rely on linear models rather than on count data models. Results
are mostly unaffected if we do.
27 If in linear models we use the Number of Past Default rather than Past Default (recall
that the registry keeps loan default indefinitely on record), the estimated coefficients of the
federal funds rate are not statistically significant possibly due to the fact that some defaults
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consistent with the different models by Allen and Gale and Diamond and
Rajan on risk-taking and risk-shifting that we summarized in Section 1.
In Model (5), we feature the loan-specific, ex-post measure of bank risk-
taking, that is, the dummyDefault that equals 1 if the granted loan defaults,
and equals 0 otherwise. This specification not only includes the federal funds
rate and the macroeconomic variables in the month prior to the origination
of the loan (t), but also in the month of default or maturity (tþ T).28
Results are most interesting. The estimated coefficient on the funds rate at
origination remains negative and statistically significant, while the estimated
coefficient on the funds rate at loan default or maturity is estimated to be
positive. This is one of our main findings. A decrease in the US federal funds
rate, which under the exchange rate regime renders monetary conditions in
Bolivia more expansionary, corresponds to a higher loan default rate at
origination, but “at the same time” to a lower default rate at maturity.
Hence expansionary monetary policy seems to encourage the initiation of
riskier loans, but it also diminishes the default rate on outstanding bank
loans! These results are fully consistent with the model in Adrian and Shin
(2011), as the reduction in credit risk for existing loans due to an expansion-
ary shock of monetary policy reduces the capital constraints for banks, thus
allowing them to take on higher risk. In later specifications, we confirm this
finding using a duration model that additionally controls for changes in
other loan and macroeconomic conditions over the life of the loan.
However, all our findings so far do not necessarily imply that banks take
more (or excessive) risk when the funds rate is low, as the loan terms at
origination (notably loan prices and collateral) may be altered to offset the
higher expected default rate. For example, in the models by Allen and Gale,
banks enter into loans with negative expected returns when they have higher
liquidity due to their moral hazard problems, as they do not suffer fully the
loan losses. In the next sections, we therefore investigate the impact of the
funds rate on the (net) expected return of the newly granted loans and on
the loan prices.
3.1.d Estimated coefficients on the control variables
But before turning to such an investigation and a deeper interpretation of the
estimated coefficients on the federal funds rate, we briefly review the
estimated coefficients on the other (control) variables across all
occur a long time ago and may not be that informative about the borrower’s current
financial condition.
28 The variable Exchange Rate Peso – Dollar at tþ T cannot be included in this specifi-
cation because of collinearity with the other independent variables.
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specifications (in this Table and already for the duration models in Table V
as well). Most of these coefficients are fairly stable in magnitude and statis-
tical significance throughout most specifications.
Large banks grant more loans to risky borrowers (Table II) and grant
more risky loans (Table V).29 Banks that have more loans on their books
grant more risky loans.30 Banks with stronger balance sheets in terms of
capital are more likely to grant loans with a higher credit risk.31 On the
other hand, banks with a higher rate of nonperformance in their loan port-
folio continue to engage subprime borrowers (the estimated coefficient in the
other specifications is not statistically significant). Firms with more debt are
more likely to repay their outstanding loans. And that is also the case if firms
borrow from the same (main) bank,32 but take no extra products.
The loan rate, collateral, and maturity are also relevant for the risk that is
taken by the bank. Ceteris paribus, loans with higher loan rates, secured
loans,33 or loans with longer maturities and balloon payments, involve a
higher probability that the borrowers are more risky, crucially suggesting
that banks may adjust loan conditions when they take on more risk (an issue
we return to shortly). The coefficients on the Federal Fundst1, however,
suggest that these adjustments do not account fully for the extra risk they
are taking when interest rates are low.
Banks in less concentrated markets lend to riskier borrowers and grant
riskier loans, possibly because more intense competition lowers lending
standards by reducing bank charter value (Keeley, 1990). The estimated
coefficients on the eight macro-economic variables are mostly insignificant
in the probit models, possibly also because of collinearity, making the sig-
nificance and magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the federal funds
29 The estimated coefficient on bank size in Model (2) is not significant. The definition of
the dependent variable precludes new borrowers from being included in this specifications
(reducing the number of observations to 19,158) suggesting that especially large banks may
engage new risky borrowers.
30 Replacing this variable with bank loan growth or dropping all bank characteristics
leaves results unaltered.
31 We also replace bank equity with Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital and run the two measures of
bank capital stand-alone or concurrently in Tables II and V, and in interactions in Table V,
but estimates are mostly unaffected (and therefore not reported).
32 If we exclude unused credit cards and overdrafts from the definition of the Scope
variable results are mostly unaffected.
33 Replacing our collateral dummy variable with the loan-to-value ratio (equal to the
estimated market value of the collateralized assets at the time of the loan origination to
the loan amount) leaves results unaltered.
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rate particularly noteworthy.34 We return to the estimates of the other
macroeconomic coefficients when we estimate time-varying duration models.
3.2 LOAN (NET) EXPECTED RETURN
Banks likely adjust loan terms when turning to riskier lending. In this
section, we therefore investigate the impact of the federal funds rate on
the (net) expected return of the newly granted loans. We define the Net
Expected Return (NER) of a 1 dollar loan to equal (a` la Saunders and
Cornett, 2012):
NER ¼ ½ð1 PÞ  1þ InterestRateð Þ þ P  Collateral Valueð Þ
 1þ InterbankRateð Þ:
P is the estimated probability of default of the loan based on Model (4) in
Table II. The Interest Rate is the annual contractual interest rate at origin-
ation and the Collateral Value is the value of collateral to the loan amount at
origination. The Interbank Rate is the interest rate the bank pays on an
interbank loan in the month prior to origination (which is the deposit rate
for the marginal funds that the bank obtains). When calculating the
Expected Return (ER), we simply set the (1þ Interbank Rate) equal to 0
(in this way removing the almost direct effect that changes in the monetary
policy rate would have on the value of the loan).
In Table III we regress, using ordinary least squares, the NER or ER of
each loan on the federal funds rate and (in Models (2) and (4) in Table III)
on the array of bank, firm, bank–firm relationship, loan (excluding those
used to calculate the expected returns), banking market, and macro variables
that were also present in Model (4) of Table II.35
The results are again interesting and strongly suggest that a decrease in the
federal funds rate reduces the (net) expected return of the loan. For example,
when controls are included, a 100 basis points drop in the federal funds rate
34 Results are further robust to the inclusion in a variety of specifications of: (i) The total
amount of loans granted to Bolivia by BIS countries (which includes the USA); (ii) the
1-year US Treasury Bill rate; (iii) the 10-year US Government Bond rate; and (iv) the yield
curve defined as the spread between the 10-year US Government Bond rate and the 1-year
US Treasury Bill rate. All interest rates and spreads can be introduced either at origination,
or at origination and at default or maturity of the loan. Results are further robust to
splitting the sample period in two almost equal halves in December 2001, which is the
month deposit insurance was introduced.
35 We can also include firm fixed effects in these regressions if we include interactions with
bank characteristics proxying for bank moral hazard, as the NER is at the bank-firm (loan)
level.
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reduces the mean expected return of newly granted loans by 350 basis points
in Model (4), implying a semi-elasticity for an otherwise mean loan with a
zero default probability that equals 25% (¼ 350/1,396). Hence, following a
decrease in the federal funds rate, banks not only are more likely to grant
loans to borrowers that are observably risky, but the (net) expected return of
these newly granted loans (which is assessed on the basis of their overall ex-
post performance) is substantially lower.
Weak creditor rights in Bolivia raise the possibility that collateral values
may not be that informative. Indeed collateral values are often higher than
the amounts banks are able to recover in the event of bankruptcy. Though
the incidence of collateral in our sample is comparable to reports from
Belgium for example (26% in Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000)), it is
much lower than the incidence reported in the US Small Business Survey
(53% in Berger and Udell (1995)), which is possibly indicative of the sub-
stantial difficulties in seizing and liquidating pledged assets in Bolivia.
In Table IV (Panel A), we therefore focus our analysis on the 9,452 loans
that are uncollateralized. Results are mostly unaffected. In Panel B, we in-
vestigate if the pricing of these uncollateralized loans that are risky, that is,
Table III. Monetary conditions and the (net) expected return of a one dollar loan
The estimates this table lists are based on ordinary least squares estimations.
The Net Expected Return of a one dollar loan equals: [(1P) * (1þ Interest Rate)þ
(P * Collateral Value)] (1þ Interbank Rate); the Expected Return of a one dollar loan
equals: (1P) * (1þ Interest Rate)þ (P * Collateral Value). P is the estimated probability
of default of the loan based on specification Table II Model (4). The Interbank Rate is the
interest rate the bank pays on an interbank loan at t 1. The definition of the other
variables can be found in Table I. The set of controls from Table II include Bank, Firm,
Bank–Firm Relationship, Loan and Banking Market Characteristics, and Macroeconomic
Conditions. A constant is always included. The number of loan observations equals 13,366.
Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. t is the month the loan was
granted. The estimated coefficients are reported in the first row and the standard errors are
reported between parentheses in the second row. Significance levels are indicated adjacent to
the coefficients. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at
the 10% level.
Variables Model
Net expected return Expected return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Federal Fundst 1 0.925*** 3.307** 1.491*** 3.496**
[0.238] [1.528] [0.238] [1.530]
Set of Controls from Table II Not included Included Not included Included
R2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
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those with Past NPL, Past Default or that are Subprime, is more aggressive.
In Panel B, we find it indeed is, by 14% in Model (2) for example (¼ 0.204/
1.463). For collateralized loans this is not the case (not reported), possibly
because banks may expect for these loans (and despite some difficulties) to
claim the collateral when needed, which may absorb some of the price
effects. Finally, in Panel C we single out the loans with the simplest return
structure in our sample, that is, those loans with a 1-Year Maturity that are
also Single-Payment. We are left with only 124 loans; yet again results are
most similar, if not stronger!
3.3 TIME TO LOAN DEFAULT
Next, we analyze the time to default or repayment of an individual loan as a
measure of its risk. As reported in Table I, the mean time to default or
repayment is 6 months, but varies between 1 and 52 months. Analyzing
the time to default or repayment with a time-varying duration model has
a number of advantages over the analysis of loan default with a probit model
(as in Model (4) of Table II).36
First, earlier loan default clearly implies more risk-taking than later loan
default. The probit model disregards this difference in the timing of default.
Second, the maturity of the granted loans may change over the monetary
cycle. In a probit model, the apparent shortening of maturity following a
decrease in the federal funds rate may lead to a fallacious inference of more
risk-taking (short-maturity loans likely have a shorter “duration”, and hence
the inability of the firm to repay the loan will be revealed earlier). In
contrast, a duration model aims to explain the changes in the hazard rate
which has the intuitive interpretation as the probability of default in period t
conditional on surviving until this period. The hazard rate is therefore ef-
fectively a per-period measure of risk and, hence, comparable between loans
with different durations. Third, and more importantly for disentangling the
impact of monetary policy on new and outstanding loans, the federal funds
rate and other macroeconomic conditions may also vary over the life of
36 Heckman and Singer (1984), Kiefer (1988), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), Greene
(2003) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005) provide comprehensive treatments of duration
analysis, while Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Duffie, Saita, and Wang
(2007) for example employ duration analysis to study the time to firm bankruptcy. The spell
in our application is the duration of time that passes before the loan defaults (as in
McDonald and Van de Gucht, 1999). Repayment prevents us from ever observing a
default on the loan, right-censoring the spell, and necessitating the use of a right-
censored robust estimator. We study only newly granted loans, effectively removing the
left-censoring problem.
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the loan. The probit model only accounts for the variation at the time of loan
origination and of repayment (or default), but not for the entire loan spell.
We rely on the maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard
model using the commonly used Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard
rate.37 We report the estimated coefficients, standard errors, and significance
levels in Table V. Model (1) features only the federal funds rate in the month
Table IV. Monetary conditions and the (net) expected return of a one dollar loan by loan
type, collateralization, and risk
The estimates this table lists are based on ordinary least squares estimations.
The net expected return of a one dollar loan equals: [(1P) * (1þ Interest Rate)þ
(P * Collateral Value)] (1þ Interbank Rate); the Expected Return of a one dollar loan
equals: (1P) * (1þ Interest Rate)þ (P * Collateral Value). P is the estimated probability
of default of the loan based on specification Table II Model (4). The Interbank Rate is the
interest rate the bank pays on an interbank loan at t 1. Risky Loan is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if any of our ex-ante measures of risky loans in Table II are equal to one (Past
NPL, Past Default, or Subprime), and equals 0 otherwise. The definition of the other vari-
ables can be found in Table I. The set of controls from Table II include Bank, Firm, Bank–
Firm Relationship, Loan and Banking Market Characteristics, and Macroeconomic
Conditions. A constant is always included. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement
of each variable.  is the month the loan was granted. The number of observations equals
9,452, 9,452, and 124, in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. The estimated coefficients are
reported in the first row and the standard errors are reported between parentheses in the
second row. Significance levels are indicated adjacent to the coefficients. ***Significant at
the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.
Variables Model
Net expected return Expected return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: uncollateralized loans
Federal Fundst 1 1.831*** 1.474*** 2.394*** 1.559***
[0.029] [0.102] [0.028] [0.099]
Panel B: uncollateralized risky loans
Federal Fundst 1 1.792*** 1.463*** 2.352*** 1.542***
[0.030] [0.102] [0.028] [0.099]
Risky Loant 1 2.910*** 0.278 3.041*** 0.547
[0.532] [0.356] [0.484] [0.335]
Federal Fundst 1 * Risky Loant 1 0.762*** 0.204** 0.804*** 0.279***
[0.131] [0.095] [0.121] [0.090]
Panel C: 1-year maturity and single-payment loans
Federal Fundst 1 1.446*** 5.052*** 2.020*** 4.337**
[0.223] [1.882] [0.204] [1.997]
In Panels A to C: Set of Controls from Table II Not included Included Not included Included
37 This baseline hazard includes a parameter of duration dependence. If this parameter is
estimated to be larger (smaller) than 1, the hazard rate is positively (negatively) duration
MONETARY POLICY, RISK-TAKING, ANDPRICING 123
prior to the loan origination, while Model (2) also includes the time-varying
changes of the US federal funds rate after loan origination until default or
repayment, that is, Federal Fundstþt.
The duration model estimates confirm our findings so far. The coefficients
of Federal Fundst1 in Models (1) and (2) are negative, statistically signifi-
cant, and equal to 0.159** and 0.151**, respectively. The coefficient of
the Federal Fundstþt in Model (2) is positive and significant at the 5% level
and equals 0.667**. In Model (3), we use the monthly changes in the federal
funds rate over the lifetime of the loan, Federal Fundstþt, instead of the
level, which yields qualitatively similar results.
To account for the demand for credit from riskier borrowers, we at once
introduce firm fixed effects in Model (4). For technical reasons, we again
turn to a linear regression model with a dependent variable Time to Default,
which equals the number of months before a loan is downgraded to the
default status and equals the value 98 if no downgrade is observed during
the sample period (98 is the number of months in the sample period and
therefore the maximum number possible). The estimated coefficients of
0.579* and 1.128***—which have the opposite signs as now the time to
default and not the hazard rate is the dependent variable—confirm the
earlier estimates.
All estimated effects are also economically relevant. A 100 basis points
decrease in the Federal Fundst1 for example in Model (2) increases the
hazard rate by a sixth, while a similar increase in the Federal Fundstþt
almost doubles the hazard rate. In sum, during periods of low interest
rates banks take on more risk and relax lending standards. Exposing a
risky cohort of loans, granted when rates were low (or even before such a
period), to increasing policy rates dramatically exacerbates their “toxicity”.
Some estimated coefficients on the time-varying macroeconomic condi-
tions in the duration models are also statistically significant. Higher inflation
in Bolivia corresponds to a lower hazard rate (possibly because it reduces the
real level of debt), while a higher price of tin and lower net exports corres-
pond to a higher hazard rate (possibly because most Bolivian exporters then
face difficulties in repaying loans). The coefficients on the growth rate of real
GDP in Bolivia and the USA, the exchange rate Peso-Dollar, and the ICRG
Country Risk measure are mostly not statistically significant.38
dependent. In unreported exercises, we also allow for nonmonotonic duration dependency
by assessing log-logistic and semi-parametric Cox specifications but results are unaltered.
38 Results are robust to the replacement of the country risk measure by its three compo-
nents (economic and political country risk matter more than financial country risk).
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Models (5)–(8) in Table V aim to further identify the source of the
changes in the hazard rate by interacting the federal funds rate with
bank asset liquidity and borrowing from foreign financial institutions
at loan origination, that is, the variables ðLiquidAssets=AssetsÞt1 and
ðForeign Funds=AssetsÞt1.39 Banks with more liquid assets may be less
constrained and banks with fewer funds from foreign financial institutions
may be less monitored, and hence both groups of banks are expected to take
more risk.
The estimates in Models (5)–(8) in Table V broadly confirm these priors,
though not all the coefficients are statistically significant. The estimates in
Model (5) for example suggest that a 100 basis points decrease in the
Federal Fundst1 increases the hazard rate for liquid banks (with a ratio of
19, i.e., 1 standard deviation above the mean) with almost a fifth, while it
hardly affects the hazard rate for illiquid banks (with a ratio of 6, i.e., 1
standard deviation below the mean). A 100 basis points increase in the
Federal Fundstþt similarly doubles the hazard rate for liquid banks and in-
creases it by three quarters for illiquid banks.
In unreported specifications, we also include interactions with
LogðAssetsÞt1, ðEquity=AssetsÞt1, and ðNPL=AssetsÞt1. Importantly,
larger banks and banks with a lower capital ratio or higher ratio of nonper-
forming loans take more risks when the funds rate is lower. We also intro-
duce interactions with HHIt1,40 but the estimated coefficients are not
significant. We further drop both the interactions with the funds rate over
the life of the loan in all exercises (as the theory is sharper about the impli-
cations for the interactions with the federal funds rate prior to origination)
and the bank fixed effects (as in Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Results,
however, are unaffected.
3.4 PRICING OF RISK
We now turn to the last step of our analysis, the investigation of the pricing
of risk on the basis of the estimated duration models, to more deeply analyze
whether there is excessive risk-taking by banks and whether it is the behavior
of banks, and not firms, that is behind our findings. Banks may take more
39 The ordinarily reported standard errors (and marginal effects) of interacted variables in
nonlinear models may require corrections (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang, and Ai,
2004). However, similar linear models broadly confirm most results.
40 With more banking competition, proxied by a lower Herfindahl–Hirschman Index,
banks have more incentives to take risk because their franchise value is lower (Keeley,
1990). Thus, with easy access to liquidity during monetary expansions, a very competitive
environment for banks may enhance risk taking (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006).
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risk, but they may adjust loan conditions, in particular its price. Our results
so far suggest that banks do not adjust loan conditions fully, as the federal
funds rate variables explain: (i) the borrower or loan risk measures despite
the inclusion of the five key loan conditions (amount, rate, collateral,
maturity, and type) in our specifications (Tables II and V); and, (ii) the
(net) expected return of the loans (Table III).
As we cannot know how these five (but also other secondary) conditions
will be adjusted to compensate for the changes in risk, we now focus on the
loan rate as the most frequently and often the only- and lastly-adjusted
salient loan condition.41 The loan rate in any case offers an easily interpret-
able nume´raire of risk. We therefore investigate how the loan rate reflects the
different components of the hazard rate that were set before it. In particular,
we examine how the loan rate accounts for: (i) the component of the hazard
rate that is explained by the federal funds rate at loan origination, and (ii)
the remaining part of the hazard rate that is explained by all the other factors
(including the four remaining loan conditions).
For each individual loan we first calculate, using the estimates of Model
(2) in Table V, a hazard rate in the month prior to the loan origination at the
median value of the federal funds rate over the sample. We are interested in
having an equal probability of a federal funds rate increase or decrease. We
take the actual values for all other independent variables,42 hence we call this
variable the Hazard Rate Component Explained by Other Variables.
Next, we calculate the hazard rate at the actual value of the funds rate in
the month prior to the loan origination, Federal Fundst1. We label the dif-
ference between this hazard rate and the Hazard Rate Component Explained
by the Other Variables, the Hazard Rate Component Explained by the
Federal Funds. This variable captures changes in the hazard rate caused
by deviations of Federal Fundst1 from its median position. Positive devi-
ations correspond to higher hazard rates that result from expansionary
monetary conditions at origination in Model (2) in Table V.
The question we try to address: “Is the banks’ appetite for risk increasing
when funds rates are low such that banks grant loans with higher credit risk
41 We cannot include loan conditions over the life of the loan, as loan conditions may not
be “ancillary”. An ancillary variable has a stochastic path that is not influenced by the
duration of the spell. Loan conditions are mostly fixed at origination. But when adjusted (in
the case of collateral), this will most likely occur in response to changes in the time to
default of the loan.
42 Except for the loan rate, which we also fix to its median. As the loan rate will be the
dependent variable now, employing an actual loan rate would obviously result in a spurious
correlation. Using its median value appropriately scales the hazard rate, facilitating the
economic relevancy assessment of the estimated coefficients.
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without adjusting the loan rate fully?” To answer this question we regress the
actual loan rate, in %, on the Hazard Rate Component Explained by the
Other Variables and the Hazard Rate Component Explained by the Federal
Funds. We include the monthly average London Interbank Offered Rate,
LIBORt, and a constant to control for the general interest rate level. The L
IBORt is the rate on US dollar denominated loans matched in maturity with
the time to repayment or default of the individual bank loans. We have
access to LIBOR rates for loans with a maximum maturity of 12 months.
Hence, we use a subsample of 26,640 loans with spells up to 1 year.43 The
OLS estimates are reported in Table VI.
The estimated coefficient on the constant in Model (1) in Table VI
suggests that the spread between loan rate and the LIBORt equals 10.8%.
As expected from previous studies, the loan rate adjusts sluggishly to
changes in the LIBORt.
44 More importantly for our purposes, the estimated
coefficient on theHazard Rate Component Explained by the Other Variables,
which equals 802**, indicates that a 10 basis points increase in this hazard
rate leads to an 80 basis points increase in the loan rate.45
If monetary conditions before origination shift to “expansionary”, that is,
if the Federal Fundst1 decreases from its median so that the Hazard Rate
Component Explained by the Federal Funds turns positive, the banks will
actually charge less on average. The estimated negative coefficient is equal to
1,019**, which is clearly smaller than the estimated positive coefficient of
the Hazard Rate Component Explained by the Other Variables. These dif-
ferential coefficients suggest that the component of the hazard rate that is
explained by the monetary policy rate has even a negative effect on the loan
rate, while the remaining part of the hazard rate (explained by all the other
factors) has a positive impact on the loan rate. This is not consistent with
loan demand driving our results. Our findings also suggest that ceteris
43 Hazard rates are calculated on the basis of the coefficients estimated using all loans.
44 The change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the LIBORt equals 0.6*** in
Model (1). This coefficient suggests sluggishness in loan rate adjustments, possibly due to
the implicit interest rate insurance offered by banks (e.g., Berlin and Mester (1998)), credit
rationing (e.g., Fried and Howitt (1980) and Berger and Udell (1992)), or the downward
drift in Bolivian interest rates during our sample period. The size of the coefficient on a
comparable variable, that is the interest rate on a government security with equal maturity
in Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) for example is around 0.3***
and 0.5***, respectively.
45 The mean hazard rate is around 20 basis points per loanmonth. If the LIBORt is
equal to 2% for example and for median monetary conditions, a hazard rate of 0% results
in a loan rate of 10.9%, while a hazard rate of 20 basis points corresponds to a loan rate of
12.5%.
MONETARY POLICY, RISK-TAKING, ANDPRICING 131
T
a
b
le
V
I.
H
a
za
rd
ra
te
s
a
n
d
th
e
lo
a
n
in
te
re
st
ra
te
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
th
is
ta
b
le
li
st
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
o
rd
in
a
ry
le
a
st
sq
u
a
re
s.
T
h
e
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
O
th
er
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
h
a
za
rd
ra
te
w
h
en
in
T
a
b
le
IV
M
o
d
el
(2
)
a
ll
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
se
t
a
t
th
ei
r
a
ct
u
a
l
v
a
lu
es
ex
ce
p
t
fo
r
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t

1
w
h
ic
h
is
se
t
to
th
e
sa
m
p
le
m
ed
ia
n
fo
r
a
ll
lo
a
n
s.
T
h
e
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
h
a
za
rd
w
h
en
in
T
a
b
le
IV
M
o
d
el
(2
)
a
ll
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
a
t
th
ei
r
a
ct
u
a
l
v
a
lu
es
m
in
u
s
th
e
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
o
f
O
th
er
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(i
.e
.,
it
ca
p
tu
re
s
ch
a
n
g
es
in
th
e
h
a
za
rd
ra
te
ca
u
se
d
b
y
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
in
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s
fr
o
m
it
s
m
ed
ia
n
).
T
h
e
L
IB
O
R
is
th
e
ra
te
o
n
U
S
d
o
ll
a
r
d
en
o
m
in
a
te
d
lo
a
n
s
m
a
tc
h
ed
in
m
a
tu
ri
ty
w
it
h
th
e
ti
m
e
to
re
p
a
y
m
en
t
o
r
d
ef
a
u
lt
o
f
th
e
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
b
a
n
k
lo
a
n
s.
T
h
e
d
ef
in
it
io
n
o
f
th
e
o
th
er
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
ca
n
b
e
fo
u
n
d
in
T
a
b
le
I.
T
h
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
lo
a
n
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
eq
u
a
ls
2
6
,6
4
0
.
S
u
b
sc
ri
p
ts
in
d
ic
a
te
th
e
ti
m
e
o
f
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t
o
f
ea
ch
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
t
is
th
e
m
o
n
th
th
e
lo
a
n
w
a
s
g
ra
n
te
d
.
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
a
re
li
st
ed
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
ro
w
a
n
d
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
th
a
t
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
b
a
n
k
-m
o
n
th
le
v
el
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
b
et
w
ee
n
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
ro
w
.
S
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
le
v
el
s
a
re
in
d
ic
a
te
d
a
d
ja
ce
n
t
to
th
e
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
.
*
*
*
S
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
;
*
*
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
;
*
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
M
o
d
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
O
th
er
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s t
8
0
2
.2
6
5
*
*
7
1
2
.5
1
9
*
*
8
0
3
.7
6
3
*
*
1
,2
3
0
.2
0
0
*
*
*
[3
1
7
.8
8
8
]
[2
9
4
.2
5
4
]
[3
2
2
.0
3
6
]
[3
0
7
.9
6
4
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
1
,0
1
9
.9
9
9
*
*
5
1
9
.5
5
5
1
,2
0
0
.8
7
8
*
*
*
3
7
,6
0
9
.6
8
9
*
*
*
[4
1
7
.0
6
6
]
[7
2
9
.8
9
9
]
[4
2
2
.7
3
2
]
[1
0
,7
1
6
.0
7
7
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
(L
iq
u
id
A
ss
et
s/
A
ss
et
s)
t

1
4
6
.9
0
4
*
*
1
3
4
.5
3
7
*
[2
0
.9
5
8
]
[6
9
.3
8
6
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
(F
o
re
ig
n
F
u
n
d
s/
A
ss
et
s)
t

1
3
3
.5
8
0
*
2
7
2
.1
8
4
*
*
*
[1
9
.4
0
6
]
[6
8
.1
5
6
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
ln
(A
ss
et
s)
t

1
2
,4
9
2
.7
1
6
*
*
[1
,1
8
5
.2
7
9
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
(L
o
a
n
s/
A
ss
et
s)
t

1
2
3
5
.6
7
1
*
*
[9
3
.5
3
6
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
(N
o
n
-P
er
fo
rm
in
g
L
o
a
n
s/
A
ss
et
s)
t

1
3
1
7
.1
0
7
*
*
*
[5
6
.4
8
8
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
(C
a
p
it
a
l/
A
ss
et
s)
t

1
4
6
3
.9
6
1
*
*
*
[1
1
2
.9
2
7
]
H
a
za
rd
R
a
te
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t
E
x
p
la
in
ed
b
y
th
e
F
ed
er
a
l
F
u
n
d
s t
x
H
er
fi
n
d
a
h
l
H
ir
sc
h
m
a
n
In
d
ex
t

1
2
7
,1
8
7
.6
2
2
*
*
*
[5
,9
1
8
.4
9
2
]
L
IB
O
R
t
0
.6
1
5
*
*
*
0
.6
3
2
*
*
*
0
.6
1
5
*
*
*
0
.6
3
2
*
*
*
[0
.0
3
3
]
[0
.0
3
4
]
[0
.0
3
3
]
[0
.0
3
4
]
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
0
.8
8
1
*
*
*
1
0
.8
0
4
*
*
*
1
0
.8
8
4
*
*
*
1
0
.8
1
4
*
*
*
[0
.1
5
6
]
[0
.1
6
1
]
[0
.1
5
6
]
[0
.1
5
7
]
R
2
0
.2
2
0
.2
2
0
.2
2
0
.2
3
132 V. IOANNIDOU ETAL.
paribus banks do not seem to require extra compensation for the risk taken
during expansionary monetary times.
Models (2) and (3) include the interactions of Hazard Rate Component
Explained by the Federal Funds with ðLiquidAssets=AssetsÞt1 and
ðForeign Funds=AssetsÞt1, respectively. We find that banks with more liquid-
ity, hence banks that are less constrained, price the increment in the hazard
rate even less so than banks that are more constrained. The opposite is true
for banks with more foreign financing, possibly because foreign institutions
monitor more.
In Model (5), we add the interactions of the Hazard Rate Component
Explained by the Federal Funds with bank size, loans/assets, nonperforming
loans/assets, capital/assets, and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, all taken
in the month prior to loan origination. We find again that more liquid and
domestically funded banks price the increment in the hazard rate less
sharply. Also smaller banks with a lower loan to asset ratio, more nonper-
forming loans, a lower capital ratio, and operating in less concentrated
banking markets price the increment in the hazard rate less sharply—recall
that all these banks also take more risk!
3.5 SUBSAMPLE STABILITY AND MARGINS OF BANK RISK-TAKING
Finally, in Table VII we check subsample stability for all estimates reported
in Models (1)–(4) from Table II and Models (1) and (2) from Table V, and in
addition explore the various salient margins of bank risk-taking by adding
interactions of the Federal Fundst1 with selected firm, relationship, loan,
and macro variables to these models. To conserve space, we stack the
relevant estimated coefficients in ten panels and suppress all other estimates
because these are mostly similar to those we have already presented in Tables
II and V, respectively.
The top panel, that is, Panel A, contains the estimates from a subsample
exercise whereby the period between 2002:4 and 2003:1 is removed. This is a
period characterized by intense political uncertainty in Bolivia (which is also
reflected in the spikes in the Bolivian T-Bill rate and the interbank rate in
Figure 1),46 yet removing this period all together does not alter the results
46 It is the period around the elections of July 2002. In July 2001, the president was
diagnosed with cancer and stepped down. He was replaced by the vice president and elec-
tions were called for July 2002. During this period, Evo Morales decided to run for presi-
dent and started to gain momentum. His potential victory—which in the end did not occur
but only by a small margin—was widely expected to lead to major changes in the political
and economic system in the direction of socialism. In addition, after the election period
violent confrontations took place between the police and demonstrators because of the coca
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much. In Panels B–D, we focus on the most-prevalent industries, that is,
Manufacturing and Wholesale and Retail Trade, and on the other industries
to see if bank risk-taking would differ by industry. Again the estimates are
mostly in line with those reported so far.
Next, Panels E–J report the interaction estimates. Important to note at
once is that also the sign, size and in many cases the statistical significance of
the estimated coefficients on Federal Fundst1 and its interactions imply that
bank risk-taking occurs across the board and is not simply an “average”
firm, relationship, or loan phenomenon.
In Panel E, the federal funds rate is interacted with
BankBorrowing > 75%t1, a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s
total outstanding bank loans are in total volume larger than the 75th per-
centile of all firms, and equal 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficients on the
interaction terms in all models imply that bank risk-taking is less
pronounced when credit is granted to the largest firms. This is likely
because small firms are more opaque and hence a relevant margin of bank
risk-taking.
In Panel F we isolate firms with single versus multiple bank relationships.
The estimates show that risk-taking is relatively muted when firms are
engaged bilaterally. This is potentially the case because the lending bank
then has to internalize all risk and can also not free ride on the monitoring
done by other banks (Carletti, 2004; Carletti, Cerasi, and Daltung, 2007).
Next, in Panel G we interact the federal funds rate with MainBankt1,
which (recall) equals 1 if the value of loans from a bank is at least 50% of the
firm’s loans, and equals 0 otherwise. Though estimated imprecisely also in
this case the estimated coefficients are not necessarily inconsistent with free
riding in the sense that a main bank is willing to take more risk because
potentially having an informational advantage (being the main bank) it can
“share” the resultant risks with other banks.
Loan characteristics do not seem to play a sizeable role in Panels H and I,
but the introduction of deposit insurance in December 2001 does (see the
lowest Panel J). Though again estimates are at times imprecise, more risk-
taking seemingly occurs after its introduction, likely because bank agency
issues then became even more pronounced. But it is important to notice that
also prior to the introduction additional risk-taking occurred with almost the
same intensity when the federal funds rate was lower.
eradication policy which was introduced after intense pressure from the USA and various
international organizations.
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4. Conclusion
We analyze the impact of monetary policy on bank loan risk-taking, pricing,
and expected returns by accessing the unique, detailed credit register of
Bolivia from 1999 to 2003. During this period, the Bolivian peso was
pegged to the US dollar, there were hardly any restrictions in the Bolivian
capital account, and the banking system was almost completely dollarized.
In addition, the Bolivian business cycle and the US federal funds rate were
not correlated. The US federal funds rate is therefore a proper measure of
the so-predetermined stance of monetary policy in Bolivia and is exogenous
to the local economic conditions. Hence, employing the US federal funds
rate and the very detailed Bolivian credit register we can examine whether
and how monetary policy rates affect banks’ loan risk-taking, pricing and
expected returns.
We find that lower monetary policy rates increase the risk appetite of
banks. Controlling for bank and firm observables and unobservable hetero-
geneity, bank–firm relationship, loan, and banking market characteristics
and macroeconomic conditions, a decrease in the US federal funds rate
makes it more likely that banks grant loans to ex-ante observable riskier
borrowers with past nonperformance or with a subprime rating, or grant
loans that are more likely to default over their life or per month outstanding.
In pointed contrast, a decrease in the federal funds rate prior to repayment
or over the loan’s life lowers the default rate! Therefore, the moment of
highest credit risk is when the monetary policy rate is low and they substan-
tially increase over the life of the loans, as was the case for example in the
USA and Europe in 2002–07 before the start of the worst financial crisis
since the 1930s, in Japan in the 1980s, or in the US in the 1920s. Our
findings, therefore, have crucial implications for bank credit risk once the
USA and Europe leave their ultralow monetary policy rates that have been
in place since 2008 and return to normal historical levels.
Results also suggest that banks do not price this additional risk they take,
both analyzing loan spreads and expected returns (including collateral
values). We further find that especially banks with more liquid assets,
fewer funds from foreign financial institutions, lower capital ratios and
more NPLs take more risk when rates are low and price this additional
risk even less so than other banks. This pricing combined with our
findings that risk-taking is more pronounced for banks with more acute
moral hazard problems, when dealing with small firms, in multiple relation-
ships or after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, suggests a causal
link from low policy rates to excessive risk-taking.
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All in all, given that credit risk is the most important risk for banks, the
results suggest that central banks should take into account the financial
stability implications of their monetary policy decisions. Therefore, our
results are consistent with the new macroprudential policy responsibilities
by central banks in Europe and USA.
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